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I. INTRODUCTION
“We, the democratically-elected leaders of our people, hereby declare
Kosovo to be an independent and sovereign state.”1 This is the operative
clause of the unilateral declaration of independence (UDI) of Kosovo.2 It is
also the recent concern of the International Court of Justice (ICJ), the
supreme judicial body of the United Nations (UN).3 The UN General
Assembly (General Assembly), prompted by a draft resolution submitted by
Serbia,4 asked the ICJ to exercise its advisory function and determine
whether the UDI, written by the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government
of Kosovo (Provisional Institutions), was in accordance with international
law.5
In late July 2010, the ICJ issued an advisory opinion answering the
General Assembly’s question (Kosovo Opinion).6 Rather than accepting the
General Assembly’s wording of the question, the ICJ investigated whether
the Provisional Institutions even wrote the UDI.7 The ICJ concluded that the
Provisional Institutions did not.8 Since the Provisional Institutions did not
issue the UDI,9 the law that governs Provisional Institutions10 did not govern
the authors of the UDI.11 Furthermore, because there is no explicit

1
Assembly of Kosovo, Kosova Declaration of Indipendence (Feb. 17, 2008) [hereinafter
Kosovo Declaration of Independence], available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/141/150
38.pdf (scroll down to page 20 of the document).
2
Id.
3
MAHASEN M. ALJAGHOUB, THE ADVISORY FUNCTION OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF
JUSTICE 1946–2005, at 1 (2006).
4
Draft Request for an Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice on Whether
the Unilateral Declaration of Independence of Kosovo is in Accordance with International
Law, U.N. Doc. A/RES/63/L.2 (Sept. 23, 2008).
5
Request for an Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice on Whether the
Unilateral Declaration of Independence of Kosovo Is in Accordance with International Law
G.A. Res. 63/3, U.N. Doc. A/RES/63/3 (Oct. 8, 2008) [hereinafter G.A. Res. 63/3].
6
Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in
Respect of Kosovo, Advisory Opinion, 2010 I.C.J. 404 (July 22) [hereinafter Kosovo
Opinion].
7
Id. at 424, para. 52.
8
Id. at 447, para. 109.
9
Id.
10
For a description of the laws governing the decision in the Kosovo Opinion, see id. at 439–
42, paras. 85–93; S.C. Res. 1244, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1244 (June 10, 1999) [hereinafter SCR
1244]; Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Constitutional Framework for
Provisional Self-Government in Kosovo, UNMIK/REG/2001/9 (May 15, 2001) [hereinafter
Constitutional Framework], available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/141/15034.pdf (scroll
down to page 121 of the document).
11
Kosovo Opinion, supra note 6, at 452, paras. 119, 121.
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prohibition of UDIs in general international law,12 the February 2008 UDI is
in accordance with international law.13
This Note will tackle the question: Why did the ICJ rule this way? The
ICJ’s objective-oriented adjustment of the General Assembly’s question as
well as the narrow14 and vague holding do not seem to amount to an
expansion of international law. However, this Note argues that this decision
unintentionally developed a new concept of the doctrine of remedial
secession: the remedial declaration of independence.
The remedial
declaration of independence could, and in the Kosovo case does, circumvent
existing international law and impose constitutional frameworks that are
designed to be temporary, but prove to be immobile.15 Furthermore, this
Note argues that institutional, doctrinal, and political barriers prevent an
explicit endorsement of Kosovo’s declaration of independence and that, by
its declaration, the Republic of Kosovo is an independent and sovereign
state.
In Part II, this Note examines the opinion in the Kosovo case itself, first
by examining the history prior to the opinion’s issue, and then by examining
both the holding of the opinion and the controversial adjustment of the
question. In Part III, this Note surveys international law regarding secession
and self-determination in international law, and concludes that the practical
import of the opinion was to give politically frustrated people a legally
recognizable option for a remedial declaration of independence. Finally, in
Part IV, this Note argues that the ICJ championed the most expansive
doctrine practically available to it without upsetting international laws and
the political nature of the creation of sovereign states.
II. THE KOSOVO OPINION
The Kosovo Opinion begins with a historical background. An analysis of
the opinion should start the same way before moving on to the crucial
elements of the case: the reformulation of the General Assembly’s question
and the opinion’s formal holding.

12

Id. at 438–39, para. 84.
Id. at 452, para. 122 (concluding that the adoption of the UDI did not violate any
applicable rule of international law).
14
But see infra notes 57–61 (arguing that the ICJ’s reformulation of the question was a
grand expansion of ICJ’s jurisdiction).
15
For the imposed frameworks and law that govern Kosovo, see Constitutional Framework,
supra note 10; SCR 1244, supra note 10.
13
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A. The Historical Background of the Kosovo Case
Kosovo is a province in southern Serbia that was granted partial
autonomy in a Yugoslavian constitution in 1974,16 but was stripped of that
autonomy in September 1990.17 Kosovo holds historical significance to
Serbia, as it is the site of the great Serbian defeat at the Battle of Kosovo to
the Ottoman Turks in 1389.18 In 1999, when Serbian President Slobodan
Milosevich suppressed the rebel Kosovo Liberation Army with force,19 the
UN Security Council (Security Council) intervened.20
On June 10, 1999, the Security Council adopted Security Council
Resolution 1244 (SCR 1244).21 SCR 1244 authorized the UN SecretaryGeneral (Secretary-General) to establish an interim civil administration in
Kosovo (UNMIK) that will transition into provisional democratic selfgoverning institutions.22 Although Kosovo is to have “substantial selfgovernment,” SCR 1244 proposed that the final status of Kosovo was to be
an autonomous part of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.23
On May 15, 2001, the UNMIK issued a Constitutional Framework for
Provisional Self-Government (Constitutional Framework), which defined the
responsibilities of the Provisional Institutions.24 As part of that framework,
“[t]he Provisional Institutions of Self-Government and their officials
shall . . . [e]xercise their authorities consistent with the provisions of UNSCR
1244(1999) and the terms set forth in this Constitutional Framework.”25
Furthermore, the Provisional Institutions was forbidden to affect or diminish
the Secretary-General’s ability to enforce SCR 1244.26 In other words, the
Provisional Institutions, which includes the Assembly of Kosovo,27 could not
decide for itself whether or not it was governed by SCR 1244.
16

УСТАВ СОЦИЈАЛИСТИЧКЕ ФЕДЕРАТИВНЕ РЕПУБЛИКЕ ЈУГОСЛАВИЈЕ [CONSTITUTION OF
SOCIALIST FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF YUGOSLAVIA] (1974); see also Henry H. Perritt, Jr.,
Final Status for Kosovo, 80 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 3, 7 (2005) (discussing the 1974 Constitution
and the establishment of Kosovo as an “autonomous province”).
17
MORTON H. HALPERIN ET AL., SELF-DETERMINATION IN THE NEW WORLD ORDER 160
(1992).
18
Id. at 38.
19
Perritt, supra note 16, at 8–9.
20
Id. at 9.
21
SCR 1244, supra note 10.
22
Id.
23
Id.
24
Constitutional Framework, supra note 10, ch. 9.
25
Id. ch. 2(a).
26
Id. ch. 8.1(b).
27
Id. ch. 9.1.1. “The Assembly [of Kosovo] is the highest representative and legislative
Provisional Institution of Self-Government of Kosovo.” Id. It is a proportionally selected
parliamentary body, chaired by a President, of 120 representatives with three-year terms. Id.
ch. 9.1.
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In a report submitted to the Security Council in 2005, Kai Eide, the
Secretary-General’s Special Envoy, reviewed the political situation in
Kosovo and recommended that the final status process envisioned in SCR
1244 commence.28 The Security Council agreed, but instructed the
Secretary-General that it would “remain actively seized of the matter.”29 A
group of nations known as the Contact Group agreed to a set of principles to
govern the final status process, which included refraining from unilateral
steps and requiring that the final status of Kosovo should be endorsed by the
Security Council.30
Between February 20, 2006 and September 8, 2006, negotiations were
held between Serbia and Kosovo.31 These talks did not progress.32 By
March 2007, “the negotiations’ potential to produce any mutually agreeable
outcome on Kosovo’s status [was] exhausted. . . . [T]he conclusion [was]
that the only viable option for Kosovo [was] independence, to be supervised
for an initial period by the international community.”33 While the Security
Council undertook the Kosovo mission, it could not come to a final decision,
and a draft resolution failed to gain any traction.34
On November 17, 2007, elections were held for several democratic
governing organizations in Kosovo.35 The inaugural session of the Assembly
28

U.N. Secretary-General, Letter dated Oct.7, 2005 from the Secretary-General addressed
to the President of the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/2005/635 (Oct. 7, 2005) [hereinafter
U.N. Secretary-General Letter dated Oct. 7, 2005].
29
Statement by the President of the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/PRST/2005/51 (Oct. 24,
2005).
30
For a list of these principles see U.N. President of the S.C., Letter dated Nov. 10, 2005
from the President of the Security Council addressed to the Secretary-General, Annex, U.N.
Doc. S/2005/709 (Nov. 10, 2005) [hereinafter U.N. President of the S.C. Letter dated Nov. 10,
2005]. The Contact Group was France, Germany, Italy, the Russian Federation, the United
Kingdom, and the United States.
31
U.N. Secretary General, Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Interim
Administration Mission in Kosovo, U.N. Doc. S/2006/361 (June 5, 2006) (covering the period
from January 1 to April 30, 2006); U.N. Secretary General, Report of the Secretary-General
on the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo, U.N. Doc S/2006/707 (Sept.
1, 2006) (covering the period from May 1 to August 14, 2006); U.N. Secretary General,
Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in
Kosovo, U.N. Doc. S/2006/906 (Nov. 20, 2006) (covering the period from August 15 to
October 31, 2006).
32
E.U./U.S./RUSSIA TROIKA ON KOSOVO, REPORT OF THE E.U./U.S./RUSSIA TROIKA ON
KOSOVO (Dec. 4, 2007) [hereinafter TROIKA REPORT], available at http://www.kosovocompromi
se.com/cms/item/topic/en.html?view=story&id=343&sectionId=2 (follow the “PDFDownload
PDF Document” link).
33
U.N. Secretary-General, Letter dated Mar. 26, 2007 from the Secretary-General
addressed to the President of the Security Council, paras. 3, 5, U.N. Doc. S/2007/168 (Mar.
26, 2007) [hereinafter U.N. Secretary-General Letter dated Mar. 26, 2007].
34
Kosovo Opinion, supra note 6, at 433, para. 71.
35
U.N. Secretary General, Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Interim
Administration Mission in Kosovo, U.N. Doc. S/2007/768 (Jan. 3, 2008).
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of Kosovo was held in January 2008.36 On February 17, 2008, the Assembly
approved the Kosovo Declaration of Independence, issued by “the
democratically-elected leaders of [the Kosovar] people.”37
In August 2008, the Permanent Representative of Serbia asked that a
request for an ICJ advisory opinion be placed on the agenda.38 During the
debate on the request, the United Kingdom’s representative in the UN called
Kosovo’s independence “a reality,” and described the request as political
rather than legal.39 The U.S. voted against the request, but the draft
resolution was nevertheless adopted 77 votes to 6, with 74 abstentions.40
On July 22, 2010, the ICJ issued its advisory opinion on the Kosovo
UDI.41 The opinion was prompted by the approved General Assembly
Resolution 63/3,42 which requested that the Court answer the following
question: “Is the unilateral declaration of independence by the Provisional
Institutions of Self-Government of Kosovo in accordance with international
law?”43
B. The Reformulation of the Question
A critical element of the Kosovo Opinion is the ICJ’s reformulation of the
question posed to it by Resolution 63/3.44 The Kosovo case is an exercise of
the ICJ’s advisory function. Therefore, the beginning of the decision
considers whether the ICJ has the jurisdiction to answer the question.45 “The
ICJ, in accordance with Articles 96 of the UN Charter and 65 of the Court’s
Statute, may give an advisory opinion upon requests submitted to it by the
General Assembly, Security Council and by other UN organs and specialized

36
U.N. Secretary General, Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Interim
Administration Mission in Kosovo, U.N. Doc. S/2008/211 (Mar. 28, 2008).
37
Kosovo Declaration of Independence, supra note 1.
38
U.N. General Assembly, Letter dated Aug. 15, 2008 from the Permanent Representative
of Serbia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General, U.N. Doc. A/63/195 (Aug.
22, 2008).
39
U.N. GAOR, 63rd Sess., 22nd plen. mtg. at 2–3, U.N. Doc. A/63/PV.22 (Oct. 8, 2008).
40
Id. at 11.
41
Kosovo Opinion, supra note 6.
42
G.A. Res. 63/3, supra note 5.
43
Id.
44
See Michael C. Mineiro, The Cowardice of the Restrictive Advisory Opinion Approach:
A Failure of the Court to Exercise its Judicial Prerogative in the Application of General
Principles of International Law in Fulfillment of International Peace and Security,
Memorandum Prepared for the Hague Academy of International Law (Aug. 4, 2010),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Delivery.cfm/SSRN_ID1654265_code1104261.pdf?a
bstractid=1654265&mirid=1 (follow the “Download This Paper” link) (“This limitation of the
question defined the entire advisory opinion.”).
45
Kosovo Opinion, supra note 6, at 412–23, paras. 17–48.
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agencies authorized by the General Assembly.”46 The language of the
question may be found in the appeal of the requesting agency; in the Kosovo
case, it is the General Assembly and Resolution 63/3.47
However, the ICJ is not, and has never been, exclusively restricted to the
question’s language.48 In an exercise of the advisory function of the ICJ, the
requesting body cannot limit the ICJ’s considerations through the language
of the question.49 In the Kosovo Opinion, however, the ICJ acknowledges
that it may, on occasion, depart from the language of the question “where the
question was not adequately formulated,” where the question does “not
reflect the ‘legal questions really in issue,’ ” or where the question requires
clarification.50 In the Kosovo Opinion, the ICJ asserts that it did not depart
from the language of the question, finding that the question posed to it was
“narrow and specific.”51
Rather, the ICJ expands the scope of its inquiry into the question.52 The
question, again: “Is the unilateral declaration of independence by the
Provisional Institutions of Self-Government of Kosovo in accordance with
international law?”53 The ICJ finds that the General Assembly had no right
to bind the court into accepting the General Assembly’s identification of the
authors of the UDI.54 In other words, the General Assembly had no right to
make the court accept as a predetermined fact that the authors of the UDI
were the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government of Kosovo. This
predetermination is “incompatible” with the ICJ’s advisory function to
accept the identities of the authors of the UDI; who wrote the UDI was a
matter capable of affecting the outcome.55 The ICJ supports its decision with
the legislative history of Resolution 63/3:56 the debate over the resolution did
not include considerations of the author of the UDI, nor did the resolution’s
original wording contain a reference to the author of the UDI.57

46

ALJAGHOUB, supra note 3, at 38.
G.A. Res. 63/3, supra note 5.
48
ALJAGHOUB, supra note 3, at 56–57.
49
Id. at 57.
50
Kosovo Opinion, supra note 6, at 423, para. 50.
51
Id. at 423–24, para. 51 (citing Interpretation of the Agreement of 25 March 1951
Between the WHO and Egypt, Advisory Opinion, 1980 I.C.J. 73, para. 35 (Dec. 20)).
52
Elena Cirkovic, An Analysis of the ICJ Advisory Opinion on Kosovo’s Unilateral
Declaration of Independence, 11 GERMAN L.J. 895, 898 (2010) (“The ICJ reformulated the
question regarding Kosovo’s independence in a way that not only modified the original
question but also created a new question . . . .”).
53
Kosovo Opinion, supra note 6, at 423, para. 49; G.A. Res. 63/3, supra note 5.
54
Kosovo Opinion, supra note 6, at 425, para. 54.
55
Id. at 424, para. 52.
56
Id. at 424–25, para. 53.
57
Id.
47
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This decision prompted fierce opposition from Kosovo Opinion
dissenters.58 Vice-President Judge Peter Tomka called this exercise an
adjustment of the question, and found that there was no need for it.59
Furthermore, examining the legislative history of Resolution 63/3, he found
that most major parties accepted that the Provisional Institutions promulgated
the UDI.60 Judge Mohamed Bennouna wrote that the ICJ “amended the
question posed in a manner contrary to its object and purpose” and that such
an exercise “would seriously prejudice the sense of judicial security” of the
ICJ.61 Judge Abdul Koroma also wrote “[never] before has [the ICJ]
reformulated a question to such an extent that a completely new question
results, one clearly distinct from the original question posed and which,
indeed, goes against the intent of the body asking it.”62 According to these
judges, the ICJ answered the question that it wanted to answer, rather than
the actual question set forth by the General Assembly.63
This is not the only opinion in which the ICJ has reformulated or adjusted
the question posed to it.64 In 1961, the General Assembly resolution
authorizing the ICJ to take up the Advisory Opinion on Certain Expenses of
the United Nations (Certain Expenses Advisory Opinion), Resolution 1731
(XVI), was the subject of a proposed but never adopted amendment by
France.65 The amendment would have changed the language of the advisory
opinion’s question.66 The ICJ finds, as a preliminary matter, that “[t]he
rejection of the French amendment does not constitute a directive to the
Court . . . if the court finds such consideration appropriate. It is not to be
assumed that the General Assembly would thus seek to fetter or hamper the
Court in its discharge of judicial functions.”67 In the Kosovo Opinion, the
ICJ cites the Certain Expenses Advisory Opinion as justification for
“decid[ing] for itself whether [the UDI] was promulgated by the Provisional

58
See Giuseppe Bianco, And Nothing Else Matters: The ICJ’s Judicial Restraint in its
Opinion on Kosovo’s Independence, 2 PERSPECTIVES ON FEDERALISM, no. 2, at N–24, N–30
nn.XIX–XX (2010), available at http://www.on-federalism.eu/attachments/073_download.pdf
(describing the dissenting judges’ censure of the ICJ’s intent-based authorship investigation).
59
Kosovo Opinion, supra note 6, at 456, para. 10 (Tomka, J., declaration).
60
Id. at 458–59, paras. 16–18 (Tomka, J., declaration).
61
Id. at 507, paras. 34–35 (Bennouna, J., dissenting).
62
Id. at 467–68, para. 3 (Koroma, J., dissenting).
63
Id.
64
See Certain Expenses of the United Nations, Advisory Opinion, 1962 I.C.J. 151, 156–57
(July 20) (explaining that the ICJ may consider any aspect of a question which it views
appropriate).
65
Id.
66
Id. at 156.
67
Id. at 157.
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Institutions of Self-Government or some other entity” despite the fact that
this was not the question asked to it.68
There is a question of whether this adjustment affected the outcome; if it
did, it may complicate the use of advisory jurisdiction by bodies such as the
General Assembly.69 The ICJ determines this question by first considering
whether SCR 1244 and the Constitutional Framework are still an active part
of international law.70 SCR 1244 declares that the resolution is in effect until
“the Security Council decides otherwise,”71 and the Security Council, besides
deciding to “remain actively seized of the matter,”72 had not acted by
February 2008.73 Additionally, there is no inherent mechanism for
termination of either SCR 1244 or the Constitutional Framework.74
Those legal regimes, and the institutions that they empowered, cannot
exceed the powers delegated to them.75 The Constitutional Framework,
which governed the Provisional Institutions, delegates to the Special
Representative the authority over “concluding agreements with states and
international organizations[,] . . . overseeing the fulfilment of commitments
in international agreements[,] . . . [and] external relations.”76 At least
between 2002 and 2005, the Assembly of Kosovo, which is authorized to
govern based on the Constitutional Framework, was not free to act as a
sovereign body.77 Under the Constitutional Framework, the Special
Representative of the Secretary-General in Kosovo has the power to annul
measures of the Provisional Institutions and declare them null and void if
they are incompatible with the Constitutional Framework.78 In his separate
declaration, Vice-President Tomka illustrated two incidents in which the
Special Representative annulled acts of the Assembly of Kosovo that were
similar to the February 2008 UDI.79
In February 2003, the Assembly of Kosovo drafted a declaration entitled
“Declaration on Kosov[o] — A Sovereign and Independent State,” which

68

Kosovo Opinion, supra note 6, at 425, para. 54.
Mark Angehr, Comment, The International Court of Justice’s Advisory Jurisdiction and
the Review of Security Council and General Assembly Resolutions, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 1007,
1021 (2009) (arguing that “a revitalized advisory jurisdiction could potentially reduce the
frequency of advisory opinion requests”).
70
Kosovo Opinion, supra note 6, at 442, para. 93.
71
SCR 1244, supra note 10, para. 19.
72
See infra note 30 and accompanying text.
73
Kosovo Opinion, supra note 6, at 441, para. 91.
74
Id.
75
Id. at 447, para. 108.
76
Id. at 446, para. 106 (quoting Constitutional Framework, supra note 10, ch. 8.1).
77
Id. at 447, para. 108.
78
Id.; id. at 464–65, para. 32 (Tomka, J., declaration).
79
Id. at 464–65, para. 32 (Tomka, J., declaration).
69
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contained language suggesting that it was a declaration of independence.80
The UN administration informed the Assembly that the declaration was
“beyond the scope of its competencies.”81 Another attempted declaration by
the Assembly in November 2005 was again pre-empted by the Special
Representative, who informed the Assembly that such a declaration “would
be in contravention to the UN Security Council resolution [1244] . . . and it
therefore will not be with any legal effect.”82
However, the ICJ notes that it is “of some significance” that the Special
Representative did not undertake similar action when faced with the
February 2008 UDI.83 The ICJ concludes that, based on prior practice of
annulling such declarations, the Special Representative has a legal “duty to
take action with regard to acts of the Assembly of Kosovo which he
considered to be ultra vires.”84 Therefore, the silence of the Special
Representative suggests that it was not a Provisional Institution that
instituted the UDI, but an entity outside of that legal framework.85
Despite this implicit confirmation, the ICJ looks beyond the immediate
responsibilities and powers delegated to the individual branches of the
Provisional Institutions when it examines the question of who was the author
of the UDI. It includes the “larger context.”86 SCR 1244 and the
Constitutional Framework contemplate “that the final status of Kosovo
would flow from, and be developed within, the framework set up by [SCR
1244].”87
However, “[t]he declaration of independence reflects the
awareness of its authors that the final status negotiations had failed and that a
critical moment for the future of Kosovo had been reached.”88 Therefore, the
authors of the UDI “set out to adopt a measure the significance and effects of

80
Assembly of Kosova, Declaration on Kosova – A Sovereign and Independent State (Feb.
3, 2003), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/141/15038.pdf (scroll down to page 6
of the document).
81
Letter from Charles H. Brayshaw, Principal Deputy Special Representative of the Sec’yGen., to Nexhat Daci, President of the Assembly of Kos. (Feb. 7, 2003), available at http://
www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/141/15038.pdf (scroll down to page 9 of the document).
82
Kosovo Opinion, supra note 6, at 464–65, para. 32 (Tomka, J., declaration) (quoting U.N.
Interim Mission in Kosovo, Press Briefing Notes, Nov. 16, 2005, at 4–5).
83
Id. at 447, para. 108 (main opinion).
84
Id. Ultra vires, Latin for “beyond the powers (of),” means beyond the scope of power
allowed or granted by a corporate charter or law. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1662 (9th ed.
2009).
85
Kosovo Opinion, supra note 6, at 447, para. 108; see also Robert Muharremi, A Note on
the ICJ Advisory Opinion on Kosovo, 11 GERMAN L.J. 867, 871 (2010) (finding that the
silence was a positive expression of the Special Representative’s understanding that the
declaration was an act not attributable to the Provisional Institutions).
86
Kosovo Opinion, supra note 6, at 445, para. 104.
87
Id.
88
Id. at 445–46, para. 105.
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which would lie outside [the legal order created for the interim phase].”89
Further, the ICJ, when it was looking to identify the authors of the UDI, did
not look to who actually signed the document, which were the 109 members
of the Assembly of Kosovo, the President of Kosovo, and the Prime Minister
of Kosovo.90
Rather, the ICJ looked to the circumstances surrounding the UDI, and it
inquired into the intent of the UDI. Was the UDI designed to work within
the existing lex specialis91 that governed the territory covered by the UDI, or
was it intended to work outside of it? “If the ICJ had come to the conclusion
that it was the [Provisional Institutions] which had declared independence, it
would have been impossible to come to a conclusion other than that the
[Provisional Institutions] had violated its competences under the
Constitutional Framework . . . .”92 Therefore, the ICJ concluded that the
February 2008 UDI was intended to work outside of the international legal
regime that governed Kosovo,93 and that regime did not preempt the UDI
from being issued.
C. The Holding
There are two holdings of the Kosovo Opinion, addressing two different
forms of international law: general and lex specialis. The holding addressing
general international law is “that general international law contains no
applicable prohibition of declarations of independence.”94 This holding
cannot be read as a determination that the declaration was legal.95
The second holding is broken into two sections. First, the holding
investigates who authored the UDI and concludes that the authors were not
the Assembly of Kosovo acting as a Provisional Institution.96 Second, as the
authors were not governed by the lex specialis of SCR 1244 and the
Constitutional Framework, the authors were in “accordance with
international law.”97

89

Id.
Id. at 435, para. 76.
91
Lex specialis, from Latin, from the phrase lex specialis derogat legi generali, means that
a specific law overrides a general law, and the shorthand of the phrase refers to specific
governing law that overrules general principles. Gráinne de Búrca, The European Court of
Justice and the International Legal Order After Kadi, 51 HARV. INT’L L.J. 1, 5 n.16 (2010).
92
Muharremi, supra note 85, at 872.
93
Kosovo Opinion, supra note 6, at 452, para. 121.
94
Id. at 438–39, para. 84.
95
Cirkovic, supra note 52, at 900.
96
Kosovo Opinion, supra note 6, 444–48, paras. 102–109.
97
Id. at 448–52, paras. 110–119.
90
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The ICJ recognizes three broad fields of general international law under
which a prohibition or a permission for unilateral declarations of
independence may be found: historical state practice, the principle of
territorial integrity, and the right to self-determination. The investigation
into the first field did not lend itself to an answer; nineteenth and twentieth
century state practice did not demonstrate a prohibition on declarations of
independence.98 The ICJ acknowledges that historically, declarations of
independence could result in a new state, but that on many occasions a new
state did not develop in spite of the declaration.99 Despite this complex
history, the ICJ notes that state “practice during this period points clearly to
the conclusion that international law contained no prohibition of declarations
of independence.”100
The ICJ does not end the historical argument with a simple statement of
customary law. Instead the ICJ recognizes that “the international law of selfdetermination developed in such a way as to create a right to independence
for the peoples of non-self-governing territories and peoples subject to alien
subjugation, domination and exploitation.”101
The principle of territorial integrity might be contrary to a permissive
ruling on declarations of independence.102 The UN Charter, as well as
several General Assembly resolutions and conferences, “enumerated various
obligations incumbent upon States to refrain from violating the territorial
integrity of other sovereign States.”103 The ICJ considers the principle of
territorial integrity an important part of the legal order.104 Its importance,
however, is irrelevant to the ICJ’s consideration of the Kosovo case: the
principle of territorial integrity only applies to state action vis-à-vis other
states, and therefore is inapplicable in this case.105
98

Id. at 436, para. 79.
Id.
100
Id.; see also Daniel Fierstein, Note, Kosovo’s Declaration of Independence: An Incident
Analysis of Legality, Policy and Future Implications, 26 B.U. INT’L L.J. 417, 431 (2008)
(“State practice suggests that there is very little, if any, support for unilateral declarations of
independence like that of Kosovo, where the government of a particular State demonstrates
opposition to secession.”).
101
Kosovo Opinion, supra note 6, at 436, para. 79.
102
Id. at 437–38, para. 81; see, e.g., id. paras. 20–27 (written statement of Spain), available
at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/141/15644.pdf (arguing that UN Conventions and state
practice confirm that respect for territorial integrity is controlling over “an alleged right to
self-determination exercised via a unilateral act”).
103
Kosovo Opinion, supra note 6, at 437, para. 80; see, e.g., Declaration on Friendly
Relations, G.A. Res. 2625 (XXV), U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., Supp. No. 18, U.N. Doc. A/8018,
at 123 (Oct. 24, 1970); Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe
art. 1, Aug. 1, 1975, 14 I.L.M. 1292 (1975).
104
Kosovo Opinion, supra note 6, at 437, para. 80.
105
Id. (“[T]he scope of the principle of territorial integrity is confined to the sphere of
relations between States.”).
99
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The ICJ does not explicitly consider whether the right to selfdetermination or remedial secession informs the question presented in the
Kosovo Opinion.106 Because, as it argues, a unilateral declaration of
independence may not “be in violation of international law without
necessarily constituting the exercise of a right conferred by it,” the ICJ finds
that there is no need to consider whether a right does exist.107 This argument
is based on the Lotus presumption that whatever international law does not
prohibit is e contrario allowed.108 The ICJ thus recognizes that unilateral
declarations of independence are not per se illegal.
III. THE CASE FOR A REMEDIAL DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE
Despite the fact that the ICJ explicitly denies that it made any ruling on
“remedial secession,”109 the process used by the ICJ to the identity of the
authors of the UDI contained elements of remedial secession doctrine. The
February 2008 UDI and the ICJ’s UDI authorship argument are similar to a
Supreme Court of Canada ruling in a similar case over the secession of
Quebec.110 The ICJ refuses this comparison; unlike the Supreme Court of
Canada, the ICJ claims it was not asked “to take a position on whether
international law conferred a positive entitlement on Kosovo unilaterally to
declare its independence.”111 Because the General Assembly did not pose
the question of remedial secession, the ICJ attempted to avoid answering it.
However, in the arguments it made supporting its holdings, the ICJ
unquestionably relied on concepts drawn from the doctrine of remedial
secession.112 The following is not only a survey of the law of remedial
secession as it applies to Kosovo; it is also the outline for an argument that
the Kosovo case established a precedent for remedial acts of selfdetermination, including the remedial declaration of independence.
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Id. at 438, para. 83.
Id. at 425–26, para. 56.
108
S.S. Lotus (Fr. V. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10, para. 46 (Sept. 7); see also
Thomas Burri, The Kosovo Opinion and Secession: The Sounds of Silence and Missing Links,
11 GERMAN L.J. 881, 883 (2010) (finding that the Lotus presumption is not appropriate in
modern international law, as the lacunae are often supplanted by “soft rules”).
109
Kosovo Opinion, supra note 6, at 425–26, 438, paras. 56, 82–83.
110
See Jure Vidmar, International Legal Responses to Kosovo’s Declaration of
Independence, 42 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 779, 814–18 (2009) (discussing the remedial
secessionist framework developed by the Canadian Supreme Court as applicable to the
Kosovar declaration of independence).
111
Kosovo Opinion, supra note 6, at 425–26, para. 56.
112
For an explicit argument that the ICJ should have granted Kosovo the right to remedial
secession based on humanist grounds, see id. at 584, para. 156 (Trindade, J., separate
opinion).
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A. Remedial Secession in International Law
Compare this preliminary remedial declaration of independence with the
existing body of law that recognizes a positive right to remedial secession.113
Remedial secession is the exercise of the right to self-determination in
“case[s] in which intra-State groups with a particular identity (minorities,
indigenous peoples) are victims of serious breaches of their fundamental
civil and human rights.”114 Remedial secession is a function of the
paradoxical discouragement and encouragement of secession in the UN
Declaration on Friendly Relations.115 The Declaration on Friendly Relations
reaffirms that, as a principle of international law, “States shall refrain in their
international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial
integrity or political independence of any State.”116 This is contrasted
against, in the same declaration, “[t]he principle of equal rights and selfdetermination of peoples.”117 The impossibility of reconciling the principle
of territoriality with the right to self-determination evolved into the doctrine
of remedial secession.
Commentators are split as to when the right to remedial secession is
activated. Some commentators argue that there are two conditions to
activation: the first, a violation of the group’s right to self-determination, and
the second, the commission of gross violations of human rights to its
detriment.118 Other commentators argue that the existence of either
condition activates the right to remedial secession.119 In either case, under
the circumstances in Kosovo, the classical right to self-determination
applies.120
These issues are not new to international courts. The League of Nations,
the predecessor to the UN and the ICJ, dealt with the issue of remedial selfdetermination in the Aaland Islands Case.121 In 1809, Sweden ceded Finland
and an archipelago in the Baltic Sea known as the Aaland Islands to
113

Vidmar, supra note 110, at 814–18.
Antonello Tancredi, A Normative ‘Due Process’ in the Creation of States Through
Secession, in SECESSION: INTERNATIONAL LAW PERSPECTIVES 171, 176 (Marcelo G. Kohen ed.,
2006).
115
KAREN KNOP, DIVERSITY AND SELF-DETERMINATION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 76–77
(2002) (noting that the right to self-determination cannot violate the principle of territorial
integrity outlined in the Declaration on Friendly Relations, supra note 103).
116
Declaration on Friendly Relations, supra note 103, pmbl.
117
Id.; Tancredi calls this clause the “safeguard clause.” Tancredi, supra note 114, at 178.
118
Tancredi, supra note 114, at 177.
119
Id.
120
Id.
121
Decision of the Council of the League of Nations on the Åland Islands Including
Sweden’s Protest (Sept. 1921) [hereinafter Aaland Islands Case], available at http://www.ku
lturstiftelsen.ax/traktater/eng_fr/1921a_en.htm.
114
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Russia.122 After the Bolshevik Revolution, Finland declared independence,
but the islands declared that they would be Swedish.123 Finland invaded the
islands to quell the uprising, and the League of Nations became involved.124
The second Commission of Rapporteurs on that case indicated while there
was not a general right to secede, the “separation of a minority from the State
of which it forms part and its incorporation into another State may only be
considered as an altogether exceptional solution, a last resort when the State
lacks either the will or the power to apply just and effective guarantees.”125
In the League of Nations’ resolution of the matter, it made certain
“guarantees” to the islanders against Finland’s full sovereignty, including an
“autonomy law” and the preservation of the islanders’ native tongue,
Swedish.126 The predecessor of the UN thus partially abrogated the principle
of territoriality in favor of self-determination.
B. Remedial Secession under Reference re Secession of Quebec
The ICJ recognized, in the Kosovo Opinion, that the Canadian Supreme
Court had addressed the issue of remedial self-determination in an advisory
opinion.127 In Reference re Secession of Quebec (Reference re Secession),
the Canadian Supreme Court responded to three questions submitted to it.128
The most important was the second question, the language of which the ICJ
quoted verbatim in the Kosovo Opinion,
Does international law give the National Assembly, legislature,
or government of Quebec the right to effect the secession of
Quebec from Canada unilaterally? In this regard, is there a
right to self-determination under international law that would
give the National Assembly, legislature or government of
Quebec the right to effect the secession of Quebec from
Canada unilaterally?129
Following this question, the Canadian Supreme Court declared that there
is no legal right for component territories of a state to secede unilaterally
122

Oliver Diggelmann, The Aaland Case and the Sociological Approach to International
Law, 18 EUR. J. INT’L L. 135, 136–37 (2007).
123
Id. at 136.
124
Id. at 137.
125
Report Submitted to the Council of the League of Nations by the Comm’n of Rapporteurs,
League of Nations Doc. B7.21/68/106, paras. 21, 28 (1921).
126
Aaland Islands Case, supra note 121.
127
Kosovo Opinion, supra note 6, at 425–26, paras. 55–56.
128
Reference re Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217 (Can.).
129
Id. para. 2; Kosovo Opinion, supra note 6, at 425, para. 55.
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from their parent.130 Furthermore, where “unilateral secession would be
incompatible with the domestic Constitution, international law is likely to
accept that conclusion subject to the right of peoples to selfdetermination.”131 This matches the Aaland Islands Case’s position that the
right to self-determination could trump territorial cohesion.132
The Canadian Supreme Court splits self-determination into two
cognizable forms: internal and external.133 Internal self-determination is
defined as: “a people’s pursuit of its political, economic, social, and cultural
development within the framework of an existing state.”134 The definition of
external self-determination, which arises “in only the most extreme of cases
and, even then, under carefully defined circumstances,” was borrowed from
the Declaration on Friendly Relations as “a sovereign and independent
State . . . [with] the free association or integration with an independent
State.”135
Further, the Canadian Supreme Court recognizes three situations in which
a cognizable right to self-determination, either internal or external, develops:
“colonial peoples,” peoples “subject to alien subjugation, domination, or
exploitation,” and peoples who claim a right to remedial secession.136 The
right to remedial secession occurs “when a people is blocked from the
meaningful exercise of its right to self-determination internally.”137 This
might occur, for example, if external and imposed frameworks (e.g., SCR
1244) prevent a conclusion mandated by international law (e.g., Kosovo’s de
facto independence).
Therefore, the Kosovo case had the hallmarks of an opportunity for the
ICJ to opine on and define remedial secession,138 but the ICJ expressly
denies that it needed to decide on whether such a right existed “outside the
context of non-self-governing territories and peoples subject to alien
subjugation, domination and exploitation.”139 A turn to classical secessionist
analysis, as the ICJ suggests, does not leave the ICJ with any clearer legal
territory.
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Reference re Secession of Quebec, 2 S.C.R. para. 111.
Id. para. 112.
132
Diggelmann, supra note 122, at 137.
133
Reference re Secession of Quebec, 2 S.C.R. para. 126.
134
Id.
135
Id. (quoting Declaration on Friendly Relations, supra note 103, at 124).
136
Id. paras. 131–134.
137
Id. para. 134.
138
Mindia Vashakmadze & Matthias Lippold, “Nothing But a Road Towards Secession”? –
The International Court of Justice’s Advisory Opinion on Accordance with International Law
of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in Respect of Kosovo, 2 GOETTINGEN J. INT’L L.
619, 636 (2010).
139
Kosovo Opinion, supra note 6, at 425–26, 438, paras. 55–56, 82–83.
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C. Problems of Classical Secession Law
In all likelihood, Kosovo does not have a right to secede in classical
international law for two reasons: one, the Kosovars are not a traditional
“peoples” whose rights to external self-determination are protected by
international law,140 and two, Kosovo does not possess the classical
requirements for statehood.141
The concept of a “people” is poorly defined in international law, allowing
disparate views to coexist and further complicate the definition.142 The term
“people” traditionally describes particular and clearly defined groups:
“citizens of a nation-state, the inhabitants in a specific territory being
decolonized by a foreign power, or an ethnic group.”143 The definition of
who is a “people” is important because the UN Charter imparts a right to
self-determination to “peoples,”144 and subsequent UN conventions support
the conclusion that a right to self-determination belong to certain
“peoples.”145
Whether or not a certain collectivity is a “people” is a qualitative
question, not a quantitative one.146 While the question has been written on
extensively, a definitive answer to whether the Kosovars are a “people” is
not forthcoming.147 The vagueness of international law provides extensive
rights to peoples, but not to similar collectivities that are not entitled to the
title.148 Because the Kosovars have not definitively asserted the right to be
140

See generally U.N. Charter art. 1, para. 2, art. 55; G.A. Res. 1514(XV), U.N. Doc.
A/4684 (Dec. 14, 1960); International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for
signature Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR].
141
See Montevideo Convention on Rights and Duties of States art. 1, Dec. 26, 1933, 3802
L.N.T.S. 19 [hereinafter Montevideo Convention].
142
Compare Fierstein, supra note 100, at 433 (finding that, despite treaty law and judicial
opinion support for defining “peoples” as an ethnic minority within a particular territory, state
practice supports defining “peoples” as an entire nation), with K. William Watson, When In
the Course of Human Events: Kosovo’s Independence and the Law of Secession, 17 TUL. J.
INT’L & COMP. L. 267, 282 (2008) (finding that defining Albanian Kosovars as a “people” is
“not a difficult task,” and that defining “peoples” is either a self-evident question or in
contrast with the definition of “[a] ‘minority’ ”).
143
Christopher J. Borgen, Kosovo’s Declaration of Independence: Self-Determination,
Secession and Recognition, ASIL INSIGHTS (Feb. 29. 2008), http://www.asil.org/insights0802
29.cfm.
144
U.N. Charter, supra note 140, art. 1, para. 2, art. 55.
145
E.g., Declaration on Friendly Relations, supra note 103, at 122; ICCPR, supra note 140;
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, opened for signature Dec.
16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3.
146
David Makinson, Rights of Peoples: A Logician’s Point of View, in THE RIGHTS OF
PEOPLES 69, 73 (James Crawford ed., 1988).
147
Zejnullah Gruda, Some Key Principles for a Lasting Solution of the Status of Kosova: Uti
Possidetis, the Ethnic Principle, and Self-Determination, 80 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 353, 367 (2005).
148
ICCPR, supra note 140, art. 1.
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considered a people and the default status of an undefined collectivity is not
a people, the Kosovar community is not a “people” under international law.
In order to determine whether Kosovo has reached or achieved full
statehood, it must first be established that the international criteria for
statehood must be met.149 In the 1993 Montevideo Convention, four criteria
were outlined to qualify whether an entity can achieve statehood: a defined
territory, a permanent population, a government, and the capacity to enter
into international relations.150 Some scholars assert that Kosovo meets three
out of four of the criteria of the Montevideo Convention, excluding
“effective government over its territory,”151 but alternatively, others conclude
that it meets all of the traditional Montevideo criteria.152 However, the
Constitutional Framework explicitly reserves the capacity to enter into
international relations to the Special Representative, not to any of the
Provisional Institutions.153 Since the Constitutional Framework is active
international law, Kosovo must not meet at least the ‘capacity to enter into
international relations’ prong of the Montevideo Convention and accordingly
does not possess all of the traditional criteria for statehood.154 Therefore,
classical secession law does not apply to Kosovo.
D. The Remedial Declaration of Independence
No matter what its intent, the ICJ frames the circumstances surrounding
the February 2008 UDI in the doctrine of remedial secession. While the ICJ
cannot find Kosovo independent or certify Kosovo’s declaration of
independence,155 this case stands as precedent to undertake such action. The
remedial declaration of independence, drawn from the Kosovo case, is not
the first act of a sovereign state, or even an act in a continuum of action with
its final goal being sovereignty.156 If the Kosovo Opinion stands for
anything, it is that international law is silent on declarations of
independence.157 Furthermore, international law cannot precisely define

149
Milena Sterio, On the Right to External Self-Determination: “Selfistans,” Secession, and
the Great Powers’ Rule, 19 MINN. J. INT’L L. 137, 147 (2010).
150
Montevideo Convention, supra note 141, art. 1.
151
Watson, supra note 142, at 290.
152
Fierstein, supra note 100, at 440 (“Kosovo seems to objectively satisfy the traditional
criteria.”).
153
Constitutional Framework, supra note 10, ch. 8.
154
Kosovo Opinion, supra note 6, at 442, para. 93.
155
See infra Part IV (the consent-driven nature of international law prevents a self-conscious
court from exerting power not granted to it).
156
Richard Caplan, The ICJ’s Advisory Opinion on Kosovo (U.S. Inst. of Peace, Peace Brief
No. 55, Sept. 17, 2010).
157
Kosovo Opinion, supra note 6, at 438–39, para. 84.
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when and how non-State action precipitates into sovereign State action.158
However, the Kosovo case clarifies an important point: when an actor who
has been partially granted sovereignty by a “parent” sovereign entity is
frustrated in its pursuit of internal self-determination by external
circumstances, the actor may issue a declaration of independence purporting
to establish external self-determination in violation of applicable lex specialis
if the “parent” does not positively exclude such action.159
1. The Partially Sovereign Actor, the “Parent,” and the Lex Specialis
In Kosovo from 1999 until 2010, political and legal authority was
undoubtedly held by the UNMIK, authorized by SCR 1244.160 This political
and legal authority derived from clause 11(e) of SCR 1244, in which “the
international civil presence” would be responsible for “[f]acilitating a
political process designed to determine Kosovo’s future status.”161 This
political process is enshrined in the Constitutional Framework, adopted in
2001, which also reserves significant powers in the Special
Representative.162 Further, the Special Representative is obligated to
“[undertake] the necessary measures to facilitate the transfer of powers and
responsibilities to the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government.”163
Having granted itself the exclusive right to hold political and legal authority
over Kosovo, the UN became the “dominant government administrator” of
Kosovo.164
Furthermore, it is exceedingly unclear who is sovereign over Kosovar
territory. An annex to SCR 1244 contemplates that the future status process
of Kosovo would end with an autonomous Kosovo within a sovereign State
of Serbia.165 However, the Assembly of Kosovo resolved that the political
process would end with an independent and sovereign Kosovo.166
158
JAMES CRAWFORD, THE CREATION OF STATES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 261–62 (2d ed.
2006) (noting that “it is not easy to formulate any satisfactory test for determining the
statehood of the seceding entity before its complete success”).
159
For a discussion on a different paradigm of self-determination and secession, which
includes factors such as human rights violations, attempted negotiated settlements, the will of
the supermajority, and economic and international political viability, and how it applies to
Kosovo, see Robert Trisotto, Seceding in the Twenty-First Century: A Paradigm for the Ages,
35 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 419 (2010).
160
SCR 1244, supra note 10.
161
Id.
162
Constitutional Framework, supra note 10, ch. 8.
163
Id. ch. 14.2.
164
Fierstein, supra note 100, at 438.
165
SCR 1244, supra note 10, Annex II; see also Prime Minister of the Republic of Serbia,
Letter dated Jan. 3, 2007 from the Permanent Representative of Serbia to the United Nations
addressed to the Secretary-General, Annex, U.N. Doc. S/2007/2, U.N. Doc. A/61/688 (Jan. 5,
2007) (“[SCR 1244] explicitly reaffirmed the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the
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Describing with any specificity the relationship between the people and
territory of Kosovo and the UN governing them is incredibly complex, but
crucial to understanding the Kosovo Opinion’s holding. For example, this is
not a protectorate relationship because Kosovo never agreed to be bound by
the Security Council and it was never entitled to do so under international
law.167 The process of slowly transferring authority from the Special
Representative to the partially sovereign Assembly of Kosovo would
properly be classified as devolution.168 There is a difficulty “reconciling
formal dependence with substantial practical autonomy” in devolution
relationships, but the partial sovereignty remains subordinated until “all
substantial legal links . . . are severed.”169
The requirement that a state must be completely separate from its parent
before achieving sovereignty is the “unitary State theory,”170 and was
endorsed by the ICJ in its predecessor form, the Permanent Court of
International Justice (PCIJ), in the Lighthouses in Crete and Samos Case.171
The question presented to the PCIJ was whether the Ottoman Empire could
enter into a concession agreement with a French company with regard to
lighthouses situated on Crete and Samos, two islands that were formally part
of the Ottoman Empire but were now functionally autonomous.172 The PCIJ
found that only by a treaty of cession could Crete claim sovereignty:
Notwithstanding its autonomy, Crete had not ceased to be a
part of the Ottoman Empire. Even though the Sultan had been
obliged to accept important restrictions on the exercise of his
rights to sovereignty in Crete, that sovereignty had not ceased
to belong to him, however it might be qualified from a
juridicial point of view.173

Republic of Serbia, stipulating that the province of Kosovo . . . should be ensured substantial
autonomy within the State of Serbia.”).
166
Assembly of Kosovo, Resolution on Riconfirmation of Political Will of Kosova People
for Kosova an Indipendent and Sovreign State (Nov. 17, 2005), available at http://www.asse
mbly-kosova.org/common/docs/Resolution.%20english,%20version.17.11.05.pdf.
167
CRAWFORD, supra note 158, at 287.
168
Id. at 349.
169
Id. at 349–51.
170
Id. at 351.
171
Lighthouses in Crete and Samos (Fr. v. Greece), 1937 P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B) No. 62 (Oct. 8)
[hereinafter Lighthouses].
172
Id. para. 3; CRAWFORD, supra note 158, at 354.
173
Lighthouses, supra note 171, para. 38.
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A separate opinion implied that the concession agreement was an
interventionist act done to protect residual imperial interests,174 which were
the lighthouses themselves.175
Applying the unitary state theory to Kosovo immediately prior to
February 2008, the only conclusion that one can draw is that strong political
links remained between the Provisional Institutions and the Special
Representative. They shared political power.176 SCR 1244 is still in effect
and the Special Representative still holds “considerable supervisory
powers.”177 Therefore, sovereign power cannot devolve to the Assembly of
Kosovo.
If the relationship is not one of devolution, then some alternative
explanation must exist for the Special Representative to declare the February
2003 and November 2005 acts of the Assembly of Kosovo illegal178 and the
ICJ to find that the February 2008 act was not illegal. Without other sources
of law, the alternative explanation must be found in the lex specialis that
governs the relationship between the two parties: SCR 1244 and the
Constitutional Framework.
The ICJ makes three explicit statements about SCR 1244 and the
framework it creates. First, it was a crisis response and “must be understood
as an exceptional measure . . . aimed at addressing the crisis.”179 Second,
SCR 1244 “was designed for humanitarian purposes; to provide a means for
the stabilization of Kosovo and for the re-establishment of a basic public
order.”180 Third, it “clearly establishe[d] an interim regime; it cannot be
understood as putting in place a permanent institutional framework.”181
Therefore, SCR 1244, the Constitutional Framework, and the powers of the
Special Representative were exceptional, temporary, and humanitarian in
purpose. But since these powers were temporary, there was a legal
obligation on all parties to constantly seek an end to the use of those
powers.182 At what point is there a danger of these powers becoming
174

Id. para. 82 (Hurst, J., separate opinion).
CRAWFORD, supra note 158, at 355–56.
176
The Constitutional Framework gave the Special Representative judicial and executive
powers over Provisional Institutions. See Constitutional Framework, supra note 10, ch. 8.1.
177
Kosovo Opinion, supra note 6, at 440–42, paras. 90–93.
178
Id. at 464–65, para. 32 (Tomka, declaration).
179
Id. at 443, para. 97 (main opinion).
180
Id. at 443–44, para. 98.
181
Id. at 444, para. 99.
182
See Constitutional Framework, supra note 10, pmbl. (“[R]esponsibilities will be
transferred to Provisional Institutions . . . with a view to facilitating the determination of
Kosovo’s future status . . . .”). But see U.N. SCOR, 54th Sess., 4011th mtg. at 14, U.N. Doc.
S/PV.4011 (June 10, 1999) (The United States representative said, in the debate over SCR
1244, that “[t]his resolution provides for the [UNMIK] to remain in place until the Security
Council affirmatively decides that conditions exist for their completion”).
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permanent, so that a declaration of independence would be timely? The ICJ
answers this question by identifying several key events that exemplified
frustrating external circumstances.183
2. The Frustrating External Circumstances
Because the UNMIK and the Special Representative could not satisfy
their legal obligations under the governing lex specialis, the ICJ implicitly
recognized that extraordinary action was appropriate.184 The ICJ believes
that the starting date of these new obligations occurred on October 24, 2005,
when the Security Council announced that it supported the commencement
of “the final status process,” which is supported by the categorization of this
statement as the chronologically first “relevant” event to the UDI.185
Responding to the Security Council’s announcement, the SecretaryGeneral appointed a Special Envoy to govern the negotiations for the final
status process, which the Security Council approved.186 However, after
multiple rounds of negotiations, the Envoy concluded in its March 2007
letter that no “mutually agreeable outcome” was available, and explicitly
endorsed a Kosovar UDI.187 This letter came after the February 2003 and
November 2005 declarations of independence by the Assembly of Kosovo,
which the Special Representative declared illegal, but before the February
2008 declaration, which the Special Representative did not.
Despite this inconsistency, the Security Council, although actively seized
of the matter, did not act on the issue188 as it “was not able to reach a
decision regarding the final status of Kosovo.” A draft resolution, circulated
but not adopted by the Security Council, would have terminated the
international civil presence in Kosovo after 120 days from the date the
resolution was adopted.189 A “Troika” of the EU, Russia, and the United
States attempted to negotiate a final status process, but despite the fact that
183

Kosovo Opinion, supra note 6, at 430–33, paras. 64–71.
Id. at 445–46, para. 105 (“The declaration of independence reflects the awareness . . . that
a critical moment for the future of Kosovo had been reached.”).
185
Id. at 430, para. 64; see also Statement by the President of the Security Council, supra
note 29 (“The Security Council agrees . . . that, notwithstanding the challenges still facing
Kosovo and the wider region, the time has come to move to the next phase of the political
process.”).
186
Statement by the President of the Security Council, supra note 29; U.N. SecretaryGeneral Letter dated Oct. 7, 2005, supra note 28.
187
Kosovo Opinion, supra note 6, at 430–32, paras. 65–69; see also U.N. Secretary-General
Letter dated Mar. 26, 2007, supra note 33 (stating that Kosovo’s future status should be
internationally supervised independence).
188
Kosovo Opinion, supra note 6, at 433, para. 71.
189
Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
and United States of America: Draft Resolution, U.N. Doc. S/2007/437 (July 17, 2007).
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talks went on for 120 days at the highest levels of Serbian and Kosovar
governments, “the parties were unable to reach an agreement on Kosovo’s
status.”190 “[M]ost, if not all, realistic options other than separation had
failed.”191
The inability of the international community and internationally
designated actors such as the Special Envoy to agree on a final status process
for Kosovo for three years (from March 2005 to February 2008) may be the
type of impediment Kosovo’s right to internal self-determination that would
permit action under the third prong of the Canadian Supreme Court’s
secession analysis.192 International negotiations, such as the one presented
here,193 are hampered because “[t]here is no agreement over common basic
principle, above all self-determination and its practical application.”194 Even
if a definitive and legally binding statement on the principle of selfdetermination existed, which could have but did not occur in the Kosovo
Case,195 remedial secession would be available “only in the most dire
situations.”196
Even though the Security Council remained seized of the Kosovo matter
and that “[t]he final decision on the status of Kosovo should be endorsed by
the Security Council,”197 the ICJ concludes that “the Security Council did not
reserve for itself the final determination of the situation in Kosovo.”198 In his
separate declaration, Vice-President Tomka complained that “the [majority’s
opinion] provides no explanation why acts which were considered as going
beyond the competencies of the Provisional Institutions in the period 2002–
2005, would no longer have any such character in 2008.”199 The explanation
is likely the Special Envoy’s March 2007 letter and proposal, the failure of
the Security Council to adopt either the Special Envoy’s proposal or an
alternative, and the Troika’s failure to find a special settlement. These
events, which only demonstrate the frustration of the UN mandate under
international law to facilitate a political process to determine Kosovo’s future
190
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status, were sufficient to give a remedial process toward external selfdetermination legitimacy under international law.
3. The Silent Agreement
Under this theory, the “parent” state constructs an interim regime that
should naturally conclude in self-determination of the actor, but fails due to
external, unforeseen circumstances. Without further action or inaction where
action is demanded from the “parent,” nothing happens. The latter presents
in the Kosovo Opinion when the ICJ classifies the silence of the Special
Representative as having “some significance.” The majority concludes that
the silence suggested “that [the Special Representative] did not consider that
the declaration was an act of the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government
designed to take effect within the legal order for the supervision of which he
was responsible.”200 Vice-President Tomka, in his separate declaration,
believes that this silence was part of a conspiracy to implement the Special
Envoy’s March 2007 proposal, and had no legal significance.201
The majority, however, concludes that where prior practice has
established that the Special Representative may declare acts of other
institutions ultra vires, the Special Representative is thereafter under a legal
obligation to do so.202 Furthermore, because the ICJ takes the silence as
evidence that the act was not ultra vires, the ICJ also concludes as a corollary
that the Special Representative’s pronouncements on the matter are legally
significant.203 This is in contrast to the UNMIK Reports to the SecretaryGeneral, which the ICJ accords no legal weight.204
Special Representatives therefore play an important discretionary role.
Whereas the Constitutional Framework might explicitly give the Special
Representative the power of external self-determination over a territory, the
Special Representative may withhold or devolve that power to local
authorities where he or she deems it is appropriate.205 The Special
Representatives hold veto power over declarations of independence. As a
matter of policy, the ICJ is permitting a much more localized (as opposed to
a more removed body such as the Security Council) determination of
whether explicit acts of external self-determination are appropriate at a given
time or place.
200
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IV. THE ICJ’S PRACTICAL LIMITS
In Judge Simma’s declaration, attached to the Kosovo Opinion, he wrote
that the ICJ was holding onto old world conceptions and not moving forward
with international law at the pace that he would like.206 For example, he
specifically criticized the ICJ’s desire to hold onto the Lotus principle.207
Unfortunately for Judge Simma, the ICJ likely had no choice in the matter.
Not only as a matter of the complexity of crafting a ruling of law on a subject
dominated by political, not legal concerns, but as a matter of the institutional
structure of international tribunals, the ICJ was likely prohibited from a more
expansive ruling.
A. Hersch Lauterpacht’s Theory of Judicial Caution
Sir Hersch Lauterpacht wrote an excellent criticism and analysis on
international judicial reticence, and one that is fully applicable to the Kosovo
case. Lauterpacht received his doctorate in law from the University of
Vienna, and wrote another dissertation for the London School of
Economics.208 He wrote his key work in 1933, The Function of Law in the
International Community.209 In 1954, he was elected a judge on the ICJ, and
in 1957, he published a work entitled The Development of International Law
by the International Court, where he articulated his theory of judicial
caution.210
Lauterpacht wrote that judicial caution—likely a central system of
reasoning driving the majority’s holding in the Kosovo Opinion—results
from “the fact that courts have to apply the law and that they have to apply
the law in force.”211 International judges have a proscribed field in which
206
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they must both find the applicable law and then utilize that law to resolve
disputes, or, in the case of the Kosovo case, answer questions posed to them.
While Lauterpacht did argue that judicial caution resulted from the principles
of the international judiciary, judges were not “limited to the barest
minimum which is required for the decision,” and could craft opinions with
serious implications in international law.212
However Lauterpacht made one point clear, which also must apply here:
“It is not [the international courts’] . . . function deliberately to change the
law so as to make it conform with their own views of justice and
expediency.”213 Why? Because “[i]f Governments are not prepared to
entrust with legislative functions bodies composed of their authorised
representatives, they will not be prepared to allow or tolerate the exercise of
such activity by a tribunal enjoined by its Statute to apply the existing
law.”214 If Serbia is not willing to entrust sovereign power to the Republic of
Kosovo, then it would not abide by an ICJ opinion that did.
This basis of judicial caution, then, has much less to do with the difficulty
of finding an international law to apply to a certain dispute. Lauterpacht
argued that the international tribunal is self-aware of the possibility of a
suicide by judgment.215 This reticence acknowledges that making an
expansive ruling based on an international judiciary’s policies, rather than a
state’s, is not a judicial feature but a political one.216 In short, the tribunal’s
rulings, judgments, and findings will always have, as a source of law, the
tribunal’s interest in self-preservation.
However, when a state seeks not to be bound by the ICJ, it does not try to
attack the ICJ’s existence. In some cases, especially the Corfu Channel
Case,217 the state that seeks not to be bound practices defiance.218 In the
Corfu Channel Case, Albania boycotted a portion of the proceedings.219
However, while there may be a greater political cost for boycotting ICJ
proceedings than ever before, the ICJ is still mindful that it has little recourse
without state participation.220
As a result, judicial caution is expressed “in the disinclination to make
pronouncements on questions not essential to an exhaustive examination of
212
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the contentions of the parties, and, generally, in avoiding so far as possible a
dogmatic manner in the statement of the law.”221 To illustrate this point,
Lauterpacht proceeded to cite a number of cases in which the ICJ, when
given an opportunity to rule aggressively on points of international law,
declined to do so.222 Judge Simma’s complaint of an overly cautious tribunal
is, therefore, not unusual.223
This judicial reticence, to make clear statements of law, impeded the
function of the ICJ as an organ that clarifies and explains the law.224
However, by restating the law as it already exists, the exercise of this
function is nearly legislative in character and may run afoul of the ICJ’s
position as an organ that exists at the whim of state consent. This extreme
judicial restraint prompted Lauterpacht to note that “writers” filled what
would have been the clarifying function of the ICJ.225 The Statute of the ICJ
specifically permits the ICJ to use writers as a source of law.226 Therefore,
the ICJ is willing to partially delegate what would be intrinsic functions to
non-state and non-tribunal actors prior to accepting certain precepts as its
own. This would support the practice of delegating to the Special
Representative a veto power over remedial declarations of independence.
Lauterpacht then uses the Corfu Channel case227 to show that, while there
were important, substantive issues of international law at play in the case that
would have benefited from clarification or restatement, the ICJ refused to
elucidate on them.228 In the Corfu Channel Case, “a great deal of the effort
of the [ICJ] . . . was directed to the elucidation of disputed and complicated
questions of fact.”229 Also, such a discussion, like an elucidation on remedial
secession and declarations of independence, might have been considered
obiter dictum230 and not directly applicable to the decision.231
221
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Certain features of Lauterpacht’s arguments become clear. (1) The ICJ’s
decisions are heavily influenced by its own awareness that a state’s sovereign
power trumps its judicial ruling. (2) Because the ICJ’s words are not binding
between states as international law, ICJ opinions may only be ratified as law
by state action. (3) Since the ICJ requires state cooperation to conduct its
affairs, it has an interest in saying as little as possible so as not to overreach.
Therefore, when it is presented with an issue involving a novel issue of
international law, unclear sovereignty over territory, and conflicting state
action, it would be more important, not less, to issue a narrow opinion.
B. Recognition
The modern understanding of international recognition of new states
complicates Kosovar self-determination and secession, and the examination
of this particular problem has been extensive.232 Because a new sovereign
state may have to be recognized by pre-existing sovereign states prior to the
full accession of a non-sovereign state to sovereignty, an explicit recognition
of the Republic of Kosovo by the ICJ could not occur in the Kosovo case. If
such a requirement exists, then the ICJ could not have declared Kosovo a
sovereign state or decided whether Kosovo was empowered with external
self-determination.
Recognition is crucial because, before they are accepted into the
international community, new states must interact with other states in a
bilateral relationship, which in turn cannot occur if states refuse to recognize
the new state.233 Non-recognition in the international community can
delegitimize a state that would otherwise fulfill the minimum legal
requirements of a state.234 Lauterpacht wrote that non-recognition is the
minimum resistance the international community can take to the illegal
formation of a state and a “continuous challenge to a legal wrong.”235
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There are two broad and recognized theories of recognition in
international law. The first, and most widely accepted, premise is known as
the declaratory theory.236 The first major adoption of the declaratory theory
was in the Tinoco Arbitration case, in which Chief Justice Taft, acting as
arbitrator, wrote, “[W]hen recognition vel non of a government is by such
nations determined by enquiry, not into its de facto sovereignty . . . but into
its illegitimacy or irregularity of origin, their non-recognition loses
something of evidential weight . . . .”237 Article 3 of the Montevideo
Convention partially codified the theory: “The political existence of a state is
independent of recognition by other states.”238 Recognition becomes a
discretionary and political act that is non-binding and without legal
significance in the purely objective determination of whether a political
entity is a sovereign state. Unsurprisingly, state practice complicates the
theory:
It is, however, difficult to maintain that an entity that has
received recognition by none or a very few States, such as the
Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus or South Africa’s
Bantustan States . . . can claim to be a State, as it cannot
demonstrate its capacity to enter into relations with other States
and thus from a functional point of view cannot be described as
a State.239
Since the capacity to enter into relations with other states defines a state,
other states’ cooperation in the formation of a new state is a necessary
precondition to the new state’s full accession to sovereignty.240
The other major theory of recognition is the constitutive theory, which
sourced the accession of a political entity to a sovereign state solely in the
recognition, either express or implied, of other sovereign states.241 The
question of how a state becomes a state is irrelevant; the only relevant
question is whether that state is recognized.242 Lauterpacht was a proponent
of the constitutive theory.243
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Lauterpacht advocated for a hybrid between the declaratory and
constitutive theories.244 He recognized, substantively, that state recognition
and accession to statehood were based on external recognition.245 A state
could not become a state just because it reached a certain point in its
development. However, this did not mean that states were free to grant or
withhold recognition on a purely subjective basis.246 In extreme cases of
denial of reality, Lauterpacht attached a duty to recognize.247 Eventually, he
saw a supra-national organ taking over the responsibility for recognizing
states, but until then the existing states took the role.248 In order for a
complete legal system to exist, there must be some entity that conclusively
determine the subjects of the system.249
Lauterpacht’s theories on recognition have not held up over time. First,
scholars acknowledge that individual states cannot assume the same
responsibilities or act with the same form of definitiveness that an
international tribunal would.250 “If individual States were free to determine
the legal status or consequences of particular situations and to do so
definitively, international law would be reduced to a form of imperfect
communications, a system for registering the asset or dissent of individual
States without any prospect of resolution.”251 Secondly, if the constitutive
theory was correct, then there could be no such thing as an illegal
recognition, but there are some acts of recognition that are considered rightly
invalid.252 Finally, the constitutive theory is relativistic.253 If the only
condition of sovereignty for a state was recognition, then there would be no
such thing as a state’s “absolute existence,” for a “state exists legally only in
its relations to other states.”254
UN membership has been identified as a criterion for transition to
independent statehood.255 A collective organization’s recognition would
have “substantial probative value” in determining statehood, and it is
possible that “the collective acknowledgement of status that might have been
effected by a system of organized collective recognition is achieved by
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admission to the United Nations.”256 Since UN membership “requires
substantial support from existing Member States, admission is [therefore]
strong evidence of the necessary status.”257 However, ICJ law, facts, and
state practice make Kosovo recognition and admission irresolvable.
The ICJ did not recognize the Republic of Kosovo during the proceedings
prior to the Kosovo Opinion. Instead, it invited the authors of the UDI—as
authors and not as the Republic of Kosovo—to join the Member States in
submitting written arguments.258 The Republic of Kosovo’s website lists
eighty-six nations as recognizing Kosovo, including the United States,
United Kingdom, and France.259 However, Russia is “utterly opposed” to
Kosovar statehood.260 Since UN membership cannot occur without the
approval or abstention of every permanent member of the Security
Council,261 and Russia is one,262 it is unlikely that the UN will recognize and
admit Kosovo.
ICJ law and state practice regarding UN membership conflict,
complicating an expansive ICJ decision in the Kosovo case. One of the
earliest cases of the exercise of ICJ advisory jurisdiction was Conditions of
Admission of a State to Membership in the United Nations (1948)
(Admissions Case).263 The question posed was whether UN Member States
could condition their consent to the admission of other states to the UN on
conditions not found within the UN Charter.264 The ICJ concludes that the
conditions for membership laid out in Article 4 of the UN Charter “constitute
an exhaustive enumeration” and that those conditions are both sufficient and
necessary for UN membership.265 It affirmatively denies that Member States
could deny membership on the basis of alternative political considerations,
finding that such considerations lead to an impermissible “indefinite and
practically unlimited power of discretion.”266 Contrary to this ruling,
256
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Member States during the Cold War used political considerations to block
membership of countries aligned with one power or another, as was
demonstrated in 1955.267
Therefore, the ICJ could recognize the practical difficulties of
acknowledging that Kosovo had acceded to a sovereign state. Despite the
acceptance of the declaratory theory, the constitutive theory holds
considerable sway in state practice; individual states still have some form of
independent, sovereign authority to impart statehood on external political
entities.268 Individual, sovereign states oppose any ICJ action to remove that
authority from them.269 So long as Russia opposed Kosovo UN membership
on political grounds, Kosovo is barred from one of the most powerful
symbols of modern statehood: collective recognition by UN membership. If
the ICJ declared a Kosovar right to secession based on remedial grounds, it
could be interpreted as denying the sovereign states’ political right to
recognize, and to withhold recognition, in favor of a legal and objective right
to secession. Therefore, following Lauterpacht’s guidelines of judicial
caution,270 it declined to rule so expansively, lest its ruling be disregarded
entirely.
C. Effectivity
The most problematic of doctrines regarding self-determination and
secession that the ICJ faces is likely the effectivity principle. The Canadian
Supreme Court, in its Reference re Secession opinion, defines the effectivity
principle as an illegal act that “may eventually acquire legal status if, as a
matter of empirical fact, it is recognized on the international plane.”271
International recognition of an entity’s statehood only has legal effect once a
political entity has achieved secession as a political fact.272 The effectivity
principle is a corollary of the constitutive theory of recognition.273 If an act
of secession is “successful in the streets, [it] might well lead to the creation
of a new state.”274
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The Canadian Supreme Court rejected the effectivity principle argument
for the secession of Quebec, asserting that it did not provide an ex ante
explanation or justification of an act.275 However, the legality of an act of
secession is not a precondition for international recognition of that new
state.276 For example, the Canadian Supreme Court, in its criticism of the
effectivity principle, argues that states are less likely to recognize a new state
if it separated from its parent state in violation of municipal law or in breach
of a good-faith duty to negotiate from that parent state.277 Thus nations are
less likely to recognize Kosovo if the declaration of independence violated
the sovereignty of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia under SCR 1244,278 or
a violation of the Constitutional Framework.279
If the ICJ expressly accepted this theory, it would directly contradict the
dozens of states that recognized Kosovo prior to the Kosovo Opinion’s
issue.280 The Canadian Supreme Court’s pronouncement that states would
withhold recognition in cases of illegal state formation is an opinion rather
than a statement of law, and has little legal precedent.281 Therefore, the
critical point of Reference re Secession’s discussion of the effectivity
principle is this: while a unilateral declaration of independence and secession
by Quebec might eventually acquire legal status, the success of that
geopolitical process would not support a doctrine that a unilateral declaration
of independence would be legal even if the subsequent secession is
recognized.282
The ICJ faces the same problem with effectivity as it does with
recognition.283 A ruling declaring the February 2008 UDI affirmatively legal
or illegal would attack the effectivity principle. This would fly in the face of
state practice and directly contradict the Lotus principle. By finding that the
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authors of the UDI were not restricted by SCR 1244,284 the ICJ permits the
effectivity principle to govern the declaration and later political acts by
individual actors. In effect, the ICJ acknowledges that the best test for the
legality of Kosovo’s independence is not in the courtroom, but in the
diplomatic arena, and affirms that the effectivity principle governs this sort
of action.285
V. CONCLUSION
The remedial declaration of independence is a new instrument for
territories seeking self-determination. The ICJ could not use the Kosovo
case to fully confirm the doctrine of remedial secession. Doing so would
step on the toes of preexisting state power and privilege. The ICJ, by
explicitly denying that it was building a doctrine of remedial secession, was
allowed to take a tiny step forward. The Kosovo case allowed the Assembly
of Kosovo, confirmed by the Special Representative’s silence and
encouraged by international indecisiveness, to make the February 2008 UDI.
The ICJ left the political ramifications of the UDI to the international
community. It was institutionally barred from doing otherwise.
The Kosovo Opinion will not be known as a seminal case, nor will it be
fondly remembered for its clarity. The remedial declaration of independence
is a compromise, not a definitive doctrine. However, Quebec separatists now
know that a remedial and unilateral declaration of independence have not
been opposed by international law.286 This territory, and others around the
globe, may learn that they also deserve the protection of the Lotus principle:
since the ICJ did not say no, it might as well be yes.
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